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Do Payday Loans Cause Bankruptcy?
Paige Marta Skiba    Vanderbilt University
Jeremy Tobacman    University of Delaware
Abstract
Payday loans are used by millions of Americans every year despite their annualized interest rates of several hundred percent. We provide new evidence on
the consequences of payday borrowing and the determinants of personal bankruptcy. Using an administrative panel data set of loan records in a regression-
discontinuity design, we estimate that payday loans increase personal bankruptcy rates by a factor of two. We assess possible mechanisms and find the
most support for a novel one: payday loan access appears to induce bankruptcy
filings by worsening the cash flow position of the household.

1. Introduction
Usury laws are often adopted to restrict high-interest lending such as payday
loans. With annual percentage rates (APRs) of 400–600 percent, payday loans
carry some of the highest interest rates available on formal credit products. Despite this, about 10 million American households borrow using payday loans
each year, and payday lenders have more storefronts in the United States than
McDonald’s and Starbucks combined (Pew Charitable Trusts 2012; Lusardi and
de Bassa Scheresberg 2013).
This paper contributes new evidence on both the impact of payday loan access
We would like to thank David Abrams, Ken Ayotte, Dan Benjamin, Neil Bhutta, David Card, Kitt
Carpenter, Raj Chetty, Michael Clemens, Stefano DellaVigna, Ed Glaeser, Michael Greenstone, Zack
Grossman, Joseph Hennawi, Joni Hersch, Mark Hoekstra, Pamela Jakiela, Kory Kroft, David Laibson, David S. Lee, Ulrike Malmendier, Paco Martorell, Justin McCrary, Markus Mobius, Ed Morrison, Sendhil Mullainathan, Kate Nicholson, Devin Pope, Matthew Rabin, Steve Raphael, Emmanuel Saez, Anna Skiba-Crafts, Mel Stephens, Justin Sydnor, Kip Viscusi, Maisy Wong, and Jonathan
Zinman for many helpful conversations and seminar audiences at the Bank of Canada, the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago, Harvard University, the Institute for Fiscal Studies, the London School
of Economics, Oxford University, the RAND Corporation, the Wharton School of the University
of Pennsylvania, Yale University, and the University of California, Berkeley, for valuable feedback.
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and the causes of personal bankruptcy. We use an administrative panel data set
from a lender and a discontinuity in the lender’s underwriting rule to study the
impact of payday loans on bankruptcy filings. The administrative panel includes
information about the timing, size, and locations of applications as well as demographics for 145,000 applicants. Individual identifiers in the administrative data
permit matching to bankruptcy petitions that are available from the Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) database.
An institutional feature of the lender’s underwriting process then allows statistical identification of the impact of payday loans on bankruptcy using a
regression-discontinuity analysis. Payday loan applications are approved if the
applicant’s credit score exceeds a fixed threshold. Regression-discontinuity analyses rely on unobservable characteristics not changing discontinuously at the
threshold.1 With this standard identifying assumption, differences in bankruptcy
rates between barely approved and barely rejected applicants can be attributed to
the causal impact of payday loan access.2
Our estimates answer the paper’s title question affirmatively: yes, access to payday loans causes a significant increase in personal bankruptcy rates. The benchmark point estimate corresponds to a near doubling of the annual bankruptcy
rate, with other specifications ranging between increases of 21 and 185 percent.
Regression-discontinuity results can sometimes be fragile, so we show exactly
how our findings depend on implementation choices, demonstrating robustness
and allowing readers to focus on their preferred specifications for quantitative
takeaways.
Even at the low end of the estimate range, the magnitudes we find are striking:
payday loan principals average about $300, but access has an economically significant effect on bankruptcy, a cumulative financial outcome. We therefore view
the remainder of the paper, which complements the main bankruptcy impact
analysis by extensively evaluating a series of possible mechanisms, as a second
essential contribution. This investigation of mechanisms also contextualizes the
paper within the literature on the determinants of bankruptcy.
A variety of forces have been implicated as drivers of bankruptcy-filing rates,
including the pecuniary benefits of debt discharge (Fay, Hurst, and White 2002),
stigma (Gross and Souleles 2002), the expansion of credit card indebtedness
(Domowitz and Sartain 1999; White 2007), adverse health and medical expense
shocks (Himmelstein et al. 2009; Morrison et al. 2013), and the ability to pay filing costs (Mann and Porter 2010; Gross, Notowidigdo, and Wang 2014). We find
evidence for a complementary force, which to our knowledge is novel in this literature: payday loans increase bankruptcy rates by worsening borrowers’ cash
flow positions.
1
For econometric foundations of the regression-discontinuity approach, see Thistlethwaite and
Campbell (1960), Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw (2001), Porter (2003), and McCrary (2008).
Many modern applications stem from Angrist and Lavy (1999). Imbens and Lemieux (2008) provide a practical guide.
2
For convenience, we refer to approval of one’s first payday loan application, conditional on applying, as the effect of payday loan access.
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Using individual-level variation3 (rather than the typical changes in state regulatory environments or zip-code-level and county-level shocks), we are able to
contribute new evidence on the effects of high-interest credit.4 Other analyses of
the effects of payday loan access include Lefgren and McIntyre (2009), Zinman
(2010), Melzer (2011), Morse (2011), Morgan, Strain, and Seblani (2012), Carrell and Zinman (2014), Bhutta (2014), Bhutta, Skiba, and Tobacman (2015), and
Carter and Skimmyhorn (2017). Caskey (2012) reviews the mixed collection of
findings in this literature, and we contextualize our contribution in Section 6.1.
This unique, large-scale, matched database and our individual-level identification
strategy allow us to explore the microeconomic channels through which credit
affects consumers, which complements the rich literature that identifies market-
level impacts of credit.
It is sometimes suggested that the central policy question is whether payday
loans suck borrowers into a downward spiral of financial distress. The answer
we come to in this paper is nuanced and involves a reframing of the question.
We find the empirical evidence compelling that payday loan access causes personal bankruptcy rates to increase. The mechanism supported most strongly is
that the bankruptcies could arise because of the cash flow burden of pressing payday finance charges. Additional theoretical work, beyond the scope of this paper,
should investigate whether this household cash flow mechanism is or is not consistent with a downward-spiral view. Beyond these considerations, it could be the
case that the bankruptcy filings benefit the filers, providing a fresh start following
their longstanding financial distress. Bankruptcy filings also cause other debt to
become delinquent, which distorts equilibrium interest rates for those who are
not payday borrowers. Instead of further discussing a possible downward spiral, we therefore attempt in Section 6.2 to seriously analyze the private and social
costs and benefits of bankruptcy filings.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide
additional background on payday loans and introduce the administrative data.
Section 3 describes our estimation strategy, focusing on the credit-score discontinuity. We present our main empirical results and robustness checks in Section
4 and discuss mechanisms driving those results in Section 5. Section 6 examines
the implications and relates our work to previous literature, and Section 7 concludes.

3
Among the vast literature in economics on borrowing and credit, there is relatively little empirical research on the causal impact of individual-level random variation in the ability to borrow
money, as in this paper. Excellent exceptions are Ausubel (1999) and Gross and Souleles (2002) on
credit cards and Karlan and Zinman (2008, 2009, 2010) on South African consumer credit.
4
Payday loans are often described as a form of “fringe banking” (Caskey 1994). Like check-
cashing services and pawnshops, payday lenders provide alternatives to traditional banks. Caskey
(1991, 1994, 2001, 2005, 2012) examines fringe banking in great detail, Flannery and Samolyk (2005)
analyze the profitability of the payday-lending industry, Elliehausen and Lawrence (2001) conduct
surveys of payday borrowers, and Stegman and Faris (2003) review the payday loan industry’s business practices.
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2. Context and Data
Administrative data were supplied for this project by a provider of financial
services that offers payday loans. To apply for a payday loan at this company,
individuals fill out paper applications and present their most recent pay stubs,
checking account statements, utility or phone bills, and state-issued photo identification cards. The lender uses applicants’ pay stubs to infer the dates of their next
paydays and assign loan due dates. Loans are collateralized only with personal
checks dated on borrowers’ upcoming paydays.5 Finance charges equal 18 percent of the loan’s principal. The 2-week loan term that is most common implies
an APR of 18 percent × 26 = 468 percent, since people who are paid biweekly
receive 26 paychecks per year.6
We study the universe of individuals whose first loan application at the company occurred at an outlet in Texas between September 2000 (when the firm entered that market) and August 2004. This includes about 1 million loan applications from 145,159 individuals. Table 1 presents demographic and background
characteristics of this population and summary information about their applications and loans.7 There is variation in the availability of the background characteristics, mostly because of changes over time in the data collection and data
retention practices by the lender.8
Overall, the available observables align with the broader population of payday
borrowers (see, for example, Elliehausen and Lawrence 2001). Table 1 also reports summary statistics for a subgroup of 31,892 applicants on which we focus
in some of the empirical analysis whose credit score is within .5 standard deviations of the passing payday loan credit-score threshold. We describe this threshold in detail in Section 3.1.
Summary statistics for the bankruptcy data are presented in Tables 2 and 3.
Personal bankruptcy petitions are in the public record and were downloaded
from PACER. We obtained the universe of 556,767 personal bankruptcy filings
5
The longstanding practice of some employers providing advances against upcoming paychecks
is distinct from the topic studied here: payday lenders do not directly garnish future paychecks to
obtain loan repayment.
6
Payday lenders typically do not allow interest to compound, but an alternative measure of the
annualized cost of liquidity from biweekly payday loans is 100 × (1.1826 − 1) = 7,295 percent.
7
All dollar values are deflated with the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers to January 2002 dollars. We replace the top and bottom .1 percent of the distributions of checking account
balance and take-home pay with signifiers for missing data. We also replace age with a signifier for
missing data if it is less than 18.
8
For the data extract we use, the company stopped collecting some work-related variables in August 2003, namely, job tenure, pay frequency, and income. It had, in December 2002, stopped collecting information on wage garnishment and homeownership. This means that only a few observations (less than 2 percent) are missing those control variables for reasons that are uncorrelated with
the time effects that we control for in all the paper’s specifications. The firm that provided the data
also offers pawn loans. Data on race and sex are collected incidentally since all of the information
on drivers’ licenses is recorded in accordance with pawnbroking underwriting rules. Those variables
are therefore available in our data only for people who had pawned an item at the company prior to
their first payday loan application. Thus, missing values for race and sex are perfectly correlated with
a dummy for not having previously taken a pawn loan at this company. We include that dummy
variable in all specifications below.
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Median

SD

279

.83
.80
265

141

.38
.40

January 2003 January 2003 1 Year
1.09
.00
3.00
66.85
36.00
91.41
36.46
35.00
11.25
234.96
65.54
551.93
4.28
2.00
7.23
.13
.34
.51
.50
.19
.39
.17
.37
.69
.46
1,699.23
1,545.14
1,047.08
.34
.47
.03
.17
.49
.50
.29
.46
.38
.49

Mean

145,159
145,159
116,261

145,159
145,159
145,157
145,154
142,407
94,384
94,384
94,384
94,384
94,384
94,384
93,997
67,908
67,908
27,923
27,923
27,922

N

264

.65
.62

January 2003
1.76
46.64
34.12
75.90
2.07
.15
.52
.19
.14
.66
1,556.91
.17
.04
.54
.27
.38

Mean

246

1,433.76

April 2003
.00
24.00
32.00
5.65
1.00

Median

135

.48
.48

1 Year
4.08
69.39
10.64
407.46
4.43
.35
.50
.39
.35
.47
880.52
.38
.19
.50
.44
.49

SD

Within .5 SD of Threshold

31,892
31,892
19,837

31,892
31,892
31,891
31,892
31,368
19,902
19,902
19,902
19,902
19,902
19,902
19,796
14,099
14,099
6,026
6,026
6,025

N

Note. Results are from the authors’ calculations based on data from a provider of financial services that offers payday loans. Included are all available
demographics for the universe of payday loan applicants at the Texas locations of the provider between September 2000 and August 2004. Quantities
are calculated from documentation submitted during each individual’s first application. These variables represent the full set of demographic controls
included (unless otherwise specified) in the regressions. Demographic control variables and dummies for their missing values are included. NSF = not-
sufficient-funds events like bounced checks.

Demographics:
Month of application
NSFs on bank statement
Months at current residence
Age
Checking account balance ($)
Years at current job
Paid weekly
Paid biweekly
Paid semimonthly
Paid monthly
Direct deposit
Monthly pay ($)
Owns home
Wages garnished
Black
Hispanic
Female
First applications:
Above credit threshold
Approved
Loan size ($)

All Data

Table 1
Payday Loan Summary Statistics
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Table 2
Texas Bankruptcy Totals, 2000–2006

Chapter 7
Chapter 13
All

Bankruptcies

Annual Personal
Bankruptcy Rate

Filers Who
Ever Applied

Petitions per
Applicant
per Year

311,864
244,903
556,767

.205
.161
.366

3,903
9,637
13,540

.384
.948
1.333

Note. The data are from the Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER)
database. The Texas-wide personal bankruptcy rate is calculated using PACER bankruptcy data and population data from the Census Bureau. Bankruptcy rates among
payday loan applicants are calculated by matching administrative data from a payday lender to individual bankruptcy filings in PACER, using first names, last names,
zip codes, and the final four digits of social security numbers.

Table 3
Payday Loan Applicants’ Bankruptcy Rates
All Credit Scores
Below

Above

Within 1 year after first
application:
Chapter 7
.41
.69
Chapter 13
1.62
1.94
Chapter 13 and dismissed
1.03
1.07
All
2.03
2.63
Within 2 years after first
application:
Chapter 7
.60
1.17
Chapter 13
2.53
3.31
Chapter 13 and dismissed
1.51
1.71
All
3.13
4.48
Applicants
25,305 119,854
N
145,159

Within .5 SD of
Approval Threshold
Below

.37
1.49
.91
1.86

Above

Within .05 SD of
Approval Threshold
Below

Above

.51
1.55
.98
2.06

.36
1.46
.95
1.82

.41
2.91
1.74
3.32

.55
.83
2.30
2.55
1.31
1.56
2.84
3.38
11,320
20,572
31,892

.44
2.63
1.46
3.07
1,370
3,328

.82
4.14
2.20
4.95
1,958

Note. Bankruptcy rates are calculated by matching administrative data from a payday lender to individual bankruptcy filings in PACER, using first names, last names, zip codes, and the final four digits
of social security numbers. Two-year rates are not annualized.

in the four US bankruptcy courts in Texas from 2000 through 2006.9 These bankruptcy data include the date of filing, the chapter (7 or 13),10 the disposition of
9
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) modified
US bankruptcy law substantially. It was enacted on April 20, 2005, and became effective 6 months
later. We lack statistical power to draw clear conclusions about the interaction of BAPCPA and payday loan access. Most applicants for payday loans we study have incomes low enough that they meet
the (more stringent) post-BAPCPA means-test criterion for a Chapter 7 filing.
10
Filing under Chapter 7 generally results in a full discharge of debt obligations. Filing under
Chapter 13 entails a reorganization of debts. Below we discuss in more detail the important differences.
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the bankruptcy case (generally, dismissal or discharge of debts),11 and individual
identifiers that permit linkage to the payday loan data.
Table 2 shows an individual bankruptcy rate (as a fraction of population) for
Texas of .366 percent per year.12 We identify debtors in the PACER bankruptcy
data as payday loan applicants if the following variables in the two data sets match
exactly: first name, last name, zip code of home residence, and last four digits of
the social security number. By these criteria, 13,540 of the 145,519 applicants filed
for personal bankruptcy during the bankruptcy sample period. Thus, the annual
bankruptcy rate among payday applicants is 13,540/(145,519 × 7) = 1.33 percent
per year, more than 3.5 times the overall annual rate in Texas from 2000 to 2006.
This average difference is also displayed over time in Online Appendix Figure
OA1.
Table 3 provides summary information about the fraction of applicants above
and below the credit threshold who subsequently filed for bankruptcy. These averages imply that people above the credit-score threshold are more likely to file.
This is true for the full sample and for samples of .5 and .05 standard deviations
around the threshold. These differences are suggestive of a relationship between
payday lending and bankruptcy. For more thorough analysis, next we turn to regressions that exploit the discontinuous access to payday loans near the credit-
score threshold.
3. Identification and Empirical Strategy
3.1. The Credit-Score Regression Discontinuity
Access to payday loans depends on a credit score calculated at the time of the
loan application by the third-party credit bureau Teletrack.13 During our observation period, the lender maintained a fairly strict threshold rule for loan approvals.
Among first-time applicants with scores below the threshold, 99.6 percent were
rejected, while 96.9 percent of first-time applicants scoring above the threshold
were approved. The threshold rule did change during our sample period. We discuss the effects of this change in Section 4.3. In most of the empirical analysis, we
pool the data and use the variable Credit Score, which equals the raw Teletrack
score minus the approval threshold that was in force at the time of the applica11
We focus primarily on bankruptcy petitions and secondarily on whether debt was eventually
discharged; filing is an indicator of financial distress (Fay, Hurst, and White 2002). Bankruptcy law
precludes creditors from contacting debtors once a petition is filed, so debtors may file to protect
themselves from creditors even if their debts are unlikely to be discharged. Hereafter, we use the
terms “petition” and “filing” interchangeably.
12
Population data are from Census Bureau, Table 1: Annual Estimates of the Population for the
United States and States, and for Puerto Rico: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2005 (https://www2.census
.gov/programs-surveys/popest/tables/2000-2005/state/totals/nst-est2005-01.xls).
13
The credit-scoring formula is proprietary, but in personal communications with Teletrack
personnel we were told these scores differ from Fair Isaac Corporation (FICO) scores in that they
depend on a shorter history of behavior and focus on borrowing in the subprime market. Though
Teletrack serves major payday lenders, the lenders establish their own criteria for approving loan
applications. In other work (Skiba and Tobacman 2008; Agarwal, Skiba, and Tobacman 2009), we
discuss more details of the credit-scoring process in the context of the profitability of payday lenders.
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Figure 1. Distribution of Teletrack scores

tion, normalized by the standard deviation of raw scores during the corresponding period. Figure 1 displays a histogram of Credit Score, which indicates that
there is discreteness in the distribution but no unusual bunching in proximity to
the threshold.
Consistent with the company’s stated policy, the credit score has a discontinuous effect on the probability that a payday loan application is approved. Figure
2 shows the probability of approval among first-time applicants (Approved) as a
function of Credit Score. Two quartic polynomials, fit independently to the data
on either side of the credit-score threshold, are superimposed on the graphs. We
quantify this visually striking discontinuity by regressing Approved on an indicator for being above the threshold (AboveThr), controlling for a polynomial in
Credit Score and background characteristics:

(1)   Approved i = b0 + b1 AboveThri + f (Credit Scorei ) + g X i¢ + d Mti¢ + ei , (1)
where Xi is a vector for borrower i of all the demographic and background characteristics provided by the company and reported in Table 1 and Mti¢ is a full set
of dummies for the month-year of the first payday loan application, so Mti¢ equals
one if individual i’s first application was in month t and zero otherwise. A variety
of choices can be made for the functional form of f(Credit Scorei), and we adopt
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Figure 2. Probability of approval by credit score

an agnostic approach. Our benchmark specifications allow f(∙) to be a quartic in
Credit Scorei interacted with AboveThri.14
Informal default is common on payday loans: at this firm, over 30 percent of
borrowers had a loan written off by the lender within a year of taking their first
loans. In choosing the threshold for loan approval, the company therefore had incentives disconnected from bankruptcy-filing probabilities. To the extent that the
company adjusted its threshold to decrease loan losses due to borrowers’ bankruptcy filings, the bankruptcy rate should fall when crossing the threshold, which
would bias our findings downward.
3.2. Identification
The identifying assumption for the regression-discontinuity design is that unobservables must not change discontinuously at the threshold. This assumption is
not directly testable, but two main avenues are available for gaining insight about
14
Table OA1 in the Online Appendix reports linear probability and probit estimates of equation
(1) based on this specification. In every regression, the coefficient on AboveThr is highly significant
and close to 1. The R2-value equals .90 when only AboveThr is included on the right-hand side. As
the subsequent columns add a quartic in Credit Score fully interacted with AboveThr, the demographics listed above, and the dummies for month of first payday loan application, the coefficient on
AboveThr hardly changes, and the R2-value increases by only 1 percent. Results from probit equations (showing marginal effects) reveal the same pattern.
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it. The first avenue relates to observable characteristics. If observables do not
change discontinuously at the threshold, that is neither necessary nor sufficient to
guarantee that unobservables also do not, but it increases our confidence. Figure
OA2 plots the 16 control variables from Table 1 versus Credit Score and indicates
reasonable but imperfect balance. Table OA2 in the Online Appendix provides
further information about balance across the threshold. It shows that the balance
of the raw variables improves as the range around the threshold shrinks; it also
shows estimates of the discontinuities using the same approach we use to estimate the bankruptcy effects of interest below.
Imbalances are most pronounced for age, checking account balance, and
months at current residence, all of which are modestly higher above the credit
score threshold. Manipulation of these types of covariates to get over the threshold would be problematic: applicants successful at this kind of manipulation
could also be successful at navigating the bankruptcy-filing process, for example.
We view this type of manipulation as unlikely for the checking account balances, which are measured with bank statements, but possible with the (unverified) variable measuring months at current residence. Were borrowers to know
the impact that this has on loan access, they might wait until a sufficient amount
of time has elapsed to apply for a loan.
Encouragingly, there is no difference in the discontinuity on the basis of
whether people have multiple applications on the same day as their first application (some people reapply immediately after being rejected). It does not appear
that applicants and the lender are trying to adjust underwriting variables in real
time to gain approval.
Reassuringly for our strategy, the particular directions of imbalances we observe across the threshold in Table OA2 and Figure OA2 usually would induce
omitted-variables bias that would go against our bankruptcy findings below. For
example, above-threshold applicants have slightly higher checking account balances and residential stability.
Moreover, institutional features of the underwriting process increase our confidence in the exogeneity of AboveThri conditional on f(Credit Scorei) for firsttime applicants. First, during the application process, the payday loan company’s employee submits information about the applicant electronically to the
company’s central servers, which in turn send a query to Teletrack. Within minutes, a notification of whether the application was approved or declined is returned to the employee. Neither applicants nor the employees in the store are
informed of the applicants’ scores or the passing credit-score threshold. Second,
Teletrack uses additional information from other lenders, which is not available
to this lender’s employees, to compute the score: an ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression of the Teletrack scores of first-time payday loan applicants on the demographic and background variables in Table 1, including a full set of monthyear dummies, yields an R2-value of just .304. This process limits the capacity of
applicants and clerks to decisively manipulate applications, which increases our
confidence that AboveThr affects an individual’s future choices only insofar as it
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affects application approval. In light of these considerations, and following best
practices for regression-discontinuity implementations, we control for all of the
available covariates and proceed.
3.3. Regression-Discontinuity Specifications
Using the credit-score discontinuity described in Section 3.2, we estimate the
effect of payday loan approval on bankruptcy at various horizons (from 1 day to
27 months) after the first payday loan application.15 Our main outcome of interest, Bankruptcyi, is an indicator for whether payday loan applicant i filed for
bankruptcy within 1 or 2 years of his or her first payday loan application. We
consider several specifications, the first of which is an OLS specification:
(2)   Bankruptcy i = b0 + b1 Approved i + f (Credit Scorei ) + g X i¢ + d Mti¢ + ei . (2)
Our main specification is a reduced-form equation:
(3)   Bankruptcy i = b0 + b1 AboveThri + f (Credit Scorei ) + g X i¢ + d Mti¢ + ei . (3)
Finally, we report instrumental-variables regressions, instrumenting for Approved in equation (2) with AboveThr.16
Analyses identified from discontinuities generally involve a trade-off as more
and more data are included around the discontinuity (that is, as the bandwidth
increases). The additional data reduce sampling noise but potentially introduce
bias as weight is placed on observations where unobservables may be correlated
with the outcome.17
We take an agnostic perspective about how to proceed in light of this trade-off,
demonstrating robustness to a variety of choices. First, we restrict to subsets of
the data, narrowing to ±.5 and ±.05 standard deviations around the credit-score
threshold. These bandwidth restrictions result in samples with 31,892 and 3,328
applicants, respectively. Second, we implement optimal bandwidth estimates fol15
The last payday loan applications in the administrative data set occur in August 2004, and we
study bankruptcies through the end of 2006, so at least 27 months of outcome data are available for
all applicants.
16
Throughout the paper, we focus on identification from first applications. In principle, more
power would be available if our first stage included all applications. However, there is more slippage
between AboveThr and application approval after the first loan application: the lender is more likely
to have a history for a repeat applicant that informs its approval choice. In addition, the regression
results reported above indicate that we already have considerable power in the first stage, and using
all applications would require correcting for intra-applicant correlation structure in the effect of
AboveThr on application approval and the effect of approval on the outcome variables of interest.
In principle, it would be possible to replicate the instrumental-variables regressions using a new
endogenous variable, an indicator for whether an individual has ever had an application approved.
17
The starkness of the trade-off is highlighted in Table OA3. Suppose that instead of studying the
effect of payday loans on bankruptcy using the discontinuity available in this field environment, we
could run an experiment that randomly assigned payday-loan access. Table OA3 reports the numbers of observations necessary to have the specified probability of detecting various effect sizes at a
95 percent confidence level. For example, if the expected effect is an increase in the bankruptcy rate
from 1.5 percent to 2 percent, then for 90 percent power almost exactly the number of observations
that we have with a .5-standard-deviation bandwidth would be required.

This content downloaded from 129.059.122.098 on February 12, 2020 11:06:05 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

496

The Journal of LAW & ECONOMICS

lowing Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014a, 2014b) and Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Third, we show how the direction and statistical significance of
our findings vary for any bandwidth.
4. Results
4.1. Descriptive Findings
Figures 3, 4, and 5 show how the 2-year bankruptcy rate varies with Credit
Score in six ways that all suggest that payday loan access increases personal bankruptcy rates. Figure 3A reports the raw bankruptcy rates, where each dot corresponds to one of 40 bins. The averages to the left and right of the threshold are
2.84 percent and 3.38 percent, respectively, as in Table 3. Smoothed polynomial
fits are also plotted with 95 percent confidence intervals. Figure 3B replicates Figure 3A, except that we use the residuals from a regression of the Bankruptcy indicator on the control variables and the month dummies.
Since filing a bankruptcy petition is such a rare outcome, averaging only 31,892
× 3 percent/40 = 24 events per bin, some volatility is evident in Figure 3A and
3B. Figure 4, before plotting, takes the cumulative sum of bankruptcy events (4A)
and residuals (4B) from left to right and plots that cumulative sum against Credit
Score. For a binary outcome variable like a bankruptcy indicator, a regression
discontinuity in levels corresponds to a regression kink in the cumulative sum, so
an effect of payday loan access on bankruptcy is present if the slope differs across
the threshold in Figure 4.
Figure 5 again shows the cumulative sums of bankruptcy events and residuals, but with the horizontal axis as the applicant’s Credit Score rank. Figure 5A
and 5B show all of the observations below the threshold and an equal number
of observations above the threshold, respectively. Again, an effect of payday loan
access on bankruptcy rates would appear as a change in slope at the threshold.
4.2. Conventional Regression-Discontinuity Results
Tables 2 and 3, along with Figures 3–5, suggest that payday loan access increases bankruptcy rates. We formalize and quantify first by estimating equations
(2) and (3) in Table 4. Regressions report point estimates and standard errors of
β1 for bankruptcies at 1- and 2-year time horizons since the first loan application.
Each point estimate in Table 4 is from a different regression. The outcome variables are multiplied by 100, so the coefficients can be interpreted as the increase
in bankruptcies in percentage points associated with unit increases in the independent variables.
Section 3 demonstrates that a large share of the variation in Approved can be
explained by AboveThr, the indicator for whether the credit score is above the
lender-defined threshold. To the extent that individual characteristics cause slippage between AboveThr and loan approval, correlation between those characteristics and propensity or ability to declare bankruptcy (for example, if loan ap-
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Figure 3. Probability of bankruptcy within 2 years. A, Raw bankruptcy rates; B, residualized
bankruptcy rates.
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Figure 4. Cumulative bankruptcies within 2 years. A, Raw cumulative bankruptcies; B, residualized cumulative bankruptcies.
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Figure 5. Cumulative bankruptcies within 2 years: ranked scores. A, Raw cumulative bankruptcies; B, residualized cumulative bankruptcies.
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−1.087
(2.233)
−.942
(2.953)
3,328

.495
1.312+
(.309)
(.675)
145,159
31,892

.326
(.228)

.946+
(.498)

.05 SD
(3)
2.289*
(.985)

.5 SD
(5)

Reduced Form

1.123*
3.025*
(.453)
(1.336)
145,159
31,892

.552+
(.334)

Full Range
(4)

8.616
(22.158)
3,328

−2.158
(16.762)

.05 SD
(6)

2.352*
(1.012)

1.155*
3.108*
(.466)
(1.372)
145,159
31,892

.567+
(.343)

.5 SD
(8)

8.820
(22.722)
3,328

−2.209
(17.160)

.05 SD
(9)

Instrumental Variables
Full Range
(7)

Note. Ordinary least squares regressions report coefficients on an indicator for whether the first payday loan application was approved. Reduced-form
report coefficients on an indicator for whether the credit score exceeds the approval threshold. The instrumental-variables regressions instrument for
loan approval with the above-threshold indicator. All effects are computed from regressions that include a quartic in the credit score interacted with the
above-threshold indicator, demographic controls, and a full set of dummies for the month-year of loan application. All regressions include demographic
control variables and dummies for their missing values. The range is the number of standard deviations around the credit-score threshold to which the
sample is restricted. Standard errors are in parentheses.
+ P < .1.
* P < .05.

N

2 Years

1 Year

.5 SD
(2)

Ordinary Least Squares

Full Range
(1)

Table 4
Conventional Regression Estimates
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proval is correlated with resourcefulness in filling out paperwork, which is also
necessary for completing a bankruptcy filing) could bias even the restricted-range
OLS estimates. We can more cleanly estimate the causal impact of payday loan
access on bankruptcy by putting AboveThr on the right-hand side, as in equation
(3). Controlling for f(Credit Score), Xi, and the month of application as well, we
obtain the results in columns 4–6 of Table 4.18
Table 4 also shows that the reduced-form effect of AboveThr on bankruptcies
is significant at the 5 percent level for the .5-standard-deviation sample. Having a
credit score above the passing threshold increases bankruptcies by 2.289 percentage points over 1 year, more than a doubling of the baseline rate of 1.864 percent.
Standard errors grow large when we restrict to .05 standard deviations on either
side of the threshold.
In columns 7–9 we instrument for Approved with AboveThr. As we would
expect given the tight relationship between Approved and AboveThr reported
above, these regressions are nearly identical to the reduced-form values in magnitude and significance. Effects for bankruptcies 2 years after the first payday loan
are generally larger than the 1-year effects, statistically and economically.
4.3. Alternative Specifications
In six important ways, this section evaluates the directional and quantitative
robustness of our conclusions. First, in Table 5 we employ the optimal bandwidth approaches of Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014a, 2014b) and Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012), which formally balance the increased precision
from additional data with the possible introduction of correlation in unobservables. Optimal bandwidths implied by these procedures tend to be larger than
the ±.5-standard-deviation windows adopted above, which imply numbers of
observations greater than 31,892. Coefficients from the optimal bandwidth specifications tend to be smaller in magnitude but more highly statistically significant
than the conventional regressions in Section 4.2. Robust estimated effects on the
2-year bankruptcy rate range from .690 to 1.858 percentage points and are generally significant at the 1 percent level.
Second, we consider alternative functional forms for f(∙) and the error structure. Instead of a quartic in Credit Scorei interacted with AboveThri, we try cubics, quadratics, and linear functions interacted with AboveThri and quartics, cubics, quadratics, and linear functions not interacted with AboveThri. Relatedly,
instead of linear probability models, we implement probit models. Most of the
coefficients in these specifications, reported in the Tables OA5–OA8, go in the
same direction and are similarly significant.
Third, we examine robustness with respect to the bandwidth and the functional
form of f(Credit Scorei) by plotting point estimates and confidence intervals as
18
The full regression results for these three specifications may be found in Table OA4. Beyond our
coefficient of interest, a few other covariates are of note. There are statistically significant and positive coefficients on homeownership, checking account balance, job tenure, and monthly pay.
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(.341)
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Uniform
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(3)
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1.196**
(.300)
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(.421)
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Triangular
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−.231
(.191)
.563**
(.191)
.563+
(.300)
127,944
Triangular
No

(5)

.174
(.216)
.990**
(.216)
.990**
(.378)
143,524
Triangular
Yes

.074
(.159)
.435**
(.159)
.435*
(.245)
143,787
Triangular
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(6)

.013
(.161)
.410*
(.161)
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(.247)
139,907
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Yes
.123
(.229)
.690**
(.229)
.690+
(.362)
130,842
Uniform
Yes

−.036
(.297)
1.394**
(.297)
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(.432)
91,771
Uniform
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(8)

−.063
(.213)
.499*
(.213)
.499+
(.300)
96,493
Uniform
No

(7)

Note. Coefficients represent the effect of payday loan access on personal bankruptcies from a separate optimal bandwidth regression-discontinuity estimation. Columns 1–4 use the optimal bandwidths suggested by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014a, 2014b); columns 5–8 use the optimal bandwidths suggested by Imbens
and Kalyanaraman (2012), as implemented by the rdrobust Stata package. Residualized bankruptcy outcomes are calculated by regressing on demographic controls
and a full set of dummies for the month-year of loan application prior to running rdrobust. All regressions include demographic control variables and dummies for
their missing values. Standard errors are in parentheses.
+ P < .1.
* P < .05.
** P < .01.

N
Kernel type
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Robust

Bias corrected

N
Kernel type
Residualized
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1 Year:
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a function of the bandwidth in Figure 6A (independent quartic functions) and
6B (independent linear functions). The horizontal axis is the bandwidth in standard deviations around the credit-score approval threshold: smaller bandwidths
restrict attention to smaller intervals around the threshold, so data points to the
left are noisier than those to the right, which include more data. Figure 6A and
6B shows statistically significant effects for almost any interval around the threshold from ±.4 standard deviations to ±1 standard deviation. To our knowledge,
it is an innovation in the literature to demonstrate robustness of regression-
discontinuity estimates in this fashion.
Fourth, in Figure 7 and associated Table OA9, we show the results of Cox proportional hazard regressions. These specifications incorporate information not
only about whether a payday loan applicant files for bankruptcy but also about
how quickly he or she does so after the payday loan application. Again, we find
statistically and economically significant evidence that payday loan access increases bankruptcy-filing rates as shown by the difference in cumulative hazard
rates for those above and below the passing credit-score threshold.
Fifth, to the extent possible, we examine heterogeneity across the credit-score
distribution. The credit-scoring formula and the threshold for approval were adjusted at the lender’s storefronts only once each during our period of observation.
On November 12, 2002, the lender began receiving credit scores from Teletrack
based on a new formula with a lower mean and variance. Exactly 3 months earlier, the company had reduced the approval threshold by two-thirds of a standard
deviation. The resulting approval rates for applications prior to August 12, 2002,
between August 12 and November 11, 2002, and from November 12, 2002, onward were 85.2 percent, 94.6 percent, and 79.1 percent, respectively. For applicants within .5 standard deviations of the threshold, the approval rates during
the three periods were 82.7 percent, 79.0 percent, and 52.1 percent, respectively.
About three-fifths of the available observations are from the period after November 12, 2002, because the lender’s business was growing rapidly, so power is limited when estimating treatment effects without that period. Table OA10 shows
that the results are less precise but statistically indistinguishable in each period
when identified separately off these several points in the Credit Score distribution.19
Sixth, the results reported above rely on data from a single payday lender,
though applicants rejected by that firm might be able to obtain payday loans elsewhere. This means that the estimates represent a lower bound on the true effect
of payday loan access on bankruptcy. Qualitatively, we expect the size of the underestimate to be moderate for two reasons. First, during our sample period most
major payday lenders used Teletrack to provide information about loan applicants. Each lender, however, chooses its own rule for approving loan applications
(and may use a smoother decision rule), and we lack information about those
19
Regardless of this demonstration of robustness, we agree with Karlan and Zinman (2010) that it
is particularly valuable to study the effects of credit access on marginally approved borrowers since
they are likely to be the first borrowers affected by changes in policy or lenders’ choices.
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Figure 6. Effect of payday loans on bankruptcy as a function of bandwidths. A, Independent
quartic function; B, independent linear function.
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Figure 7. Effect of payday loan access on bankruptcy hazards

practices.20 If all lenders choose exactly the same threshold, our estimated coefficients will not reflect bias due to substitution opportunities. To the extent that
the firms have comparable costs (Flannery and Samolyk 2005) and the industry is
competitive (Skiba and Tobacman 2008), they would adopt identical thresholds
in equilibrium. We also suspect that the underestimation of the effect of payday
loan approval on bankruptcy is small because the company’s loans remain attractive to rejected applicants. Of the 20 percent of applicants who were first rejected,
48 percent reapplied. Only 9 percent of reapplicants were approved, but those
who were approved borrowed on average $2,485 and paid $415 in interest, similar to initially approved applicants who cumulatively borrowed $2,793 and paid
$477 in interest.
Moving beyond those essentially speculative considerations, we attempt to
quantify the possible bias due to outside borrowing opportunities. Table 6 reveals how the estimated treatment effects vary with proxies for the lender’s zipcode-level market share. Local market share is proxied as follows. For each new
applicant, we count the number of the company’s stores visited by applicants residing in the new applicant’s zip code. We divide this number by the Census Bureau’s ZIP Codes Business Patterns’ year-specific count of establishments with
North American Industry Classification System codes 522291 and 522390 (Bhutta 2014). Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 show that, as expected, the results attenuate when the lender has a low (below-median) market share, though the standard error on the point estimate in column 1 is large. The estimates in column 3
20
Endogeneity of the approval decision rules does not matter for our estimates. The distribution
of credit scores is smooth near the credit-score approval threshold, as shown in Figure 1.
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Table 6
Effects of Payday Loan Approval on Bankruptcy
Filings by Market Structure

1 Year:
AboveThr
AboveThr × Company Store Ratio
2 Years:
AboveThr
AboveThr × Company Store Ratio
N
Company Store Ratio

Low
Ratio
(1)

High
Ratio
(2)

.302
(1.941)

2.592*
(1.129)

2.102*
(1.000)
.029
(.038)

.896
(2.546)

3.287*
(1.536)

2.635+
(1.355)
.065
(.052)
31,757

5,785
<1

25,972
≥1

Interacted
Ratios
(3)

Note. Results are estimated reduced-form effects on bankruptcy filings, in percentage points, with standard errors in parentheses. The sample is restricted
to a ±.5-standard-deviation range around the credit-score threshold. Ratios
of company stores in the borrower’s home zip code to the number of establishments in that zip code are from the Census Bureau’s ZIP Codes Business
Patterns, with North American Industry Classification System codes of 522291
and 522390. All regressions include a quartic in the credit score interacted with
the above-threshold dummy, demographic controls, and a full set of dummies
for month of loan application. Demographic control variables and dummies
for their missing values are included.
+ P < .1.
* P < .05.

are from regressions interacting AboveThr with the market-share proxy.21 In the
high-market-share zip codes, we estimate effects of payday loan access that are
large and significant at both 1- and 2-year horizons.22
Considering this collection of six tests together, we find that the positive effect of payday loan access on bankruptcy appears robust to optimal bandwidth
algorithms, the functional form of the relationship with the credit score, many
reasonable bandwidth choices, analysis using hazard models, the location of the
threshold in the credit-score distribution, and the degree of competition in the
local payday-lending market. Next we investigate the mechanisms that could give
rise to this economically and statistically large effect.
21
The coefficient on the interaction term in column 3 is statistically insignificant, but the main
effect is close to the N-weighted average of the point estimates in columns 1 and 2.
22
Applicants further below the threshold are less likely to be able to successfully reapply at a competing payday lender. Regressions with larger bandwidths, which include individuals with very low
scores, will suffer less from this source of attenuation bias.
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5. Mechanisms
The typical payday loan is quite small: in our data set the mean and median
principal amounts are approximately $300. This section investigates the interesting question of how access to these loans can impact a cumulative financial outcome like bankruptcy.
5.1. Assets and Liabilities of Bankruptcy Filers
Debtors filing for bankruptcy protection must provide the court with schedules of detailed information documenting their assets and liabilities.23 This information is publicly available in PACER. We hand coded the data for a threshold
sample of the 100 post-payday-application bankruptcy filers closest to the credit-
score threshold on each side, plus those with equal scores at the endpoints.24
Table 7 reports summary information about their balance sheets.
Substantial empirical support has been found for strategic default to escape
outstanding obligations, at least in the sense that debtors’ pecuniary incentives
to file correlate strongly with bankruptcy propensities. Fay, Hurst, and White
(2002) find that each $1,000 increase in the financial benefit of a bankruptcy filing increased the predicted probability of such a filing by .021 of a percentage
point. Domowitz and Sartain (1999) and Gross and Souleles (2002) provide evidence that higher credit card debt predicts higher probabilities of bankruptcy,
and White (2007) elaborates on this with supportive evidence.
The balance sheet data in Table 7 show substantial unsecured liabilities, with a
mean of $27,880, which indicates considerable possible financial benefit from a
bankruptcy filing. However, by the time of the observed filings, the median approved borrower had no payday loan debt outstanding from the company that
supplied our data. Thus, strategic default to escape outstanding payday loan balances does not appear to be directly implicated as the mechanism driving our
results.
5.2. Short-Run Responses
The empirical analysis above focuses on the cumulative effect of payday loan
access until 1 or 2 years after the first loan application. Some evidence on the determinants of bankruptcy points to motives that would induce shorter-run effects
of credit access. First, applicants might (erroneously) believe that imminent debt
erasure means it would be to their advantage to borrow as much as possible prior
to a filing. Bankruptcy courts generally do not tolerate such short-run abuse of
bankruptcy protection; regardless, the evidence from filers’ balance sheets suggests that many payday loans are repaid or written off by the time of filing, which
raises the question of how payday loans cause bankruptcy. Figure 8 reports point
23
Debts not listed on the petition will not be discharged, and misrepresentation on the petition is
grounds for dismissal, so debtors have strong incentives to be comprehensive.
24
This resulted in review of 211 filings, 104 below the threshold and 107 above.
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Table 7
Payday Loan Applicants’ Assets and
Liabilities in Bankruptcy

Total assets:
Mean
Median
SD
Personal property:
Mean
Median
SD
Real property:
Mean
Median
SD
Liabilities:
Mean
Median
SD
Secured debt:
Mean
Median
SD
Unsecured debt:
Mean
Median
SD
Company payday debt:
Mean
Median
SD
Other payday debt:
Mean
Median
SD

Below
Threshold

Above
Threshold

105,905
105,784
83,156

131,149
125,788
80,009

67,249
60,300
67,463

85,408
82,620
59,081

20,802
17,432
17,252

20,772
15,046
18,243

110,581
87,560
85,524

116,513
99,094
75,514

82,543
72,994
78,995

88,786
77,310
63,228

28,037
16,868
29,988

27,726
17,480
30,208

11
0
66

159
0
335

41
0
179

88
0
285

Note. Results, in dollars, are from bankruptcy petition filings for 211 payday loan applicants (104 below and 107
above the passing credit score threshold) who filed for
bankruptcy after their first payday loan application. The
samples are not exactly balanced because of ties in scores.
Data are from the Public Access to Court Electronic Records database matched to records from a payday loan
company.
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Figure 8. Long-run effects of payday loans on bankruptcies

estimates of the effect of payday loan access on bankruptcy filing on time horizons from several days to several years. It confirms that the directional effects
are robust to the time horizon we examine, and it displays no disproportionate
short-run response. Estimated coefficients are from the reduced-form specification, equation (3), with ±.5-standard-deviation windows around the threshold.
A second possible reason that payday loan access could have a short-run effect
on bankruptcy concerns filing fees. Mann and Porter (2010) argue that filing fees
affect the chapter of a bankruptcy filing. Gross, Notowidigdo, and Wang (2014)
use a natural experiment to estimate the impact of positive liquidity shocks on
filing rates. They find large very short-run effects, which supports the view that
sometimes liquidity infusions can be used to pay filing fees. Together, the balance
sheet information shown in Table 7 and the estimates at various time horizons
reported in Table 6 and Figure 8 suggest that a different mechanism is more likely
to give rise to the effect of payday loan access on bankruptcy.
5.3. Subsequent Payday Loan Borrowing and the Cash Flow Hypothesis
This section investigates the possibility that payday loan access increases the
personal bankruptcy rate via household cash flow. Table 8 reports the effect of
payday loan access on number of applications, total dollar amount borrowed,
and total finance charges at the lender. Here we use the same regression specifications as our main results in Table 4. Approval for one payday loan evidently
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1,771.73**
−183
2,851
1,866.17**
−372.9
1,470

1,664.83**
−66.8
20,553
1,666.65**
−158.6
12,224

273.31**
−12.3
20,553
272.14**
−28.9
12,224

1,634.40**
−34.1
97,252
1,758.51**
−85.8
51,895

266.00**
−6.2
97,252
284.76**
−15.5
51,895

291.26**
−33.7
2,851
300.95**
−68
1,470

5.044**
−.598
2,851
5.426**
−1.26
1,470

.05 SD
(3)

4.570**
4.727**
−.111
−.225
97,252
20,553
4.876**
5.124**
−.279
−.552
51,895
12,224

.5 SD
(2)

.5 SD
(5)

271.34**
−9.7
97,252
330.54**
−25.9
51,895

1,708.76**
−53
97,252
2,090.36**
−143.3
51,895
298.21**
−28.1
20,553
358.42**
−68.3
12,224

1,837.11**
−152.6
20,553
2,243.55**
−375.2
12,224

4.626**
5.136**
−.172
−.513
97,252
20,553
5.146**
6.801**
−.465
−1.304
51,895
12,224

Full Range
(4)

Reduced Form

466.31**
−134.9
2,851
529.25*
−246.1
1,470

2,745.38**
−734.7
2,851
3,106.49*
−1351.1
1,470

7.043**
−2.392
2,851
8.751+
−4.558
1,470

.05 SD
(6)

.5 SD
(8)

278.44**
−9.9
97,252
346.83**
−27.2
51,895

1,753.47**
−54
97,252
2,193.38**
−150.2
51,895

307.80**
−28.7
20,553
391.29**
−74.5
12,224

1,896.21**
−155.8
20,553
2,449.32**
−408.8
12,224

4.747**
5.301**
−.176
−.525
97,252
20,553
5.419**
7.425**
−.488
−1.421
51,895
12,224

Full Range
(7)

498.56**
−143.6
2,851
532.57*
−247.4
1,470

2,935.25**
−780.2
2,851
3,125.96*
−1355.7
1,470

7.530**
−2.537
2,851
8.805+
−4.574
1,470

.05 SD
(9)

Instrumental Variables

Note. Each coefficient, standard error, and observation total comes from a separate regression. Observation totals are lower than for the bankruptcy regressions
because the payday loan data end sooner than the bankruptcy data. All regressions include a quartic in the credit score interacted with the AboveThr dummy, demographic control variables and dummies for their missing values, and a full set of dummies for month of loan application.
+ P < .1.
* P < .05.
** P < .01.

N

2 Years

N
Finance charges:
1 Year

2 Years

N
Payday loans:
1 Year

2 Years

Applications:
1 Year

Full Range
(1)
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Table 8
Effects of Payday Loan Approval on the Stream of Subsequent Payday Borrowing
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results in substantial follow-on activity. The reduced-form regression with range
restricted to ±.5 standard deviations implies that the approval of a first-time payday loan application results in an average of 5.1 more payday loan applications
at the company within the next year. Borrowing is increased by $1,837 over that
1-year horizon, while finance charges paid to the company increase by $298 over
the same period. These results are all significant at the 1 percent level.
The effect on finance charges speaks most clearly to the mechanism behind the
bankruptcy effect. Suppose bankruptcy filers’ unsecured debt carries a 15 percent
APR.25 Then, drawing again on data from Table 7, we find that, over the first year
after a payday loan application, the interest burden from payday loans would
have averaged $298/($27,880 × 15 percent) = 7 percent of those individuals’ annual liquid debt interest burden.26 Moreover, credit card debt service might be
easier to postpone, for example, by remitting only a minimum payment. This 7
percent increase in the debt-related household cash flow burden could suffice to
tip financially stressed payday loan applicants into bankruptcy.
5.4. Collections Pressure and the Automatic Stay
One complementary possibility is that payday loan borrowing and default results in increased collections activity,27 and the collections activity motivates
dunned borrowers to seek protection via the bankruptcy code’s automatic stay.
The automatic stay prohibits any collections activity by creditors holding secured
and unsecured claims. Over half of the borrowers in our data have a payday loan
that results in a bounced check within 1 year of their first loan, and over 30 percent have a loan that is written off and sold to a collection agency, so avoiding
collections pressure is plausibly an important motive.
We investigate this hypothesized mechanism in Figure 9 and Online Appendix Figures OA9–OA11. Figure 9 plots the daily rates of default on payday loans,
measured by bouncing of the postdated check, versus the number of days from
the bankruptcy-filing date to the loan due date. (Loans due before the filing date
appear to the left of 0.) The figures have two main features, and they give rise to a
two-part interpretation. First, bounced checks are common for this population:
among loans due within 100 days of the bankruptcy filing, over 10 percent re25
The Federal Reserve’s G19 data series on consumer credit implies a debt-weighted average
nominal interest rate on credit card debt of about 15 percent. This could imply an underestimate
of the liquid debt service burden for payday loan applicants if they have higher-rate cards or disproportionately pay penalty interest rates, or it could be an overestimate if payday loan borrowers
disproportionately let interest accrue while making small payments and then eventually default at
high rates on their credit cards.
26
Almost identically, elsewhere we report median scheduled minimum debt payments (including principal and interest) for the population of payday loan applicants of $4,000 per year (Bhutta,
Skiba, and Tobacman 2015).
27
It is possible that the payday lender or the third party are aggressive in collections practices,
though threatening physical harm is prohibited by the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. We found
no published papers quantifying such threats, although of course it could be possible. We understand that the payday lender’s internal collections department attempts to collect on the debt for a
few weeks and then sells the debt to a third-party collection agency.
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Figure 9. Payday loan default rates around the bankruptcy filing date

sult in bounced checks. If desire for an automatic stay motivates the bankruptcy
filing, borrowers apparently wait a long time after payday-related collections activity begins before they complete their bankruptcy filings, and defaults continue
to occur after the filings. Second, within a week of the bankruptcy filing on either side, bounced-check rates abruptly and briefly spike above 30 percent. It is
possible that those filers coordinated the timing of their bankruptcy filings and
bounced checks so as to minimize the duration of default-related collections activity. Of course, it is also possible that broader financial distress brought about
by both the payday loan default and the bankruptcy filing and/or the advice given
by the payday borrowers’ bankruptcy lawyers resulted in coordinated timing of
these events.28

28
Figures OA9–OA11 complement this evidence. They show that many borrowers would have
benefited from the automatic stay long before their bankruptcy filings, while some were newly exposed to collections activity right before their filings. Figures OA9–OA11 also show similar patterns
for collections by the payday lender and collections by whoever buys the delinquent debt after 90
days of internal collections.
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6. Discussion
6.1. Interpretation and Related Literature
Our findings complement and extend the rich but unsettled literatures on the
effects of payday loan access and the causes of bankruptcy filings, which we discuss in turn. Research on the impact of payday loans comes to disparate conclusions (Caskey 2012). Zinman (2010), Morse (2011), and Carter and Skimmyhorn (2017) generally find beneficial consequences of payday loan access. Carrell
and Zinman (2014), Melzer (2011), and Campbell, Martínez-Jerez, and Tufano
(2012) generally find the opposite. Lefgren and McIntyre (2009), Morgan, Strain,
and Seblani (2012), Bhutta (2014), and Bhutta, Skiba, and Tobacman (2015) obtain null or mixed effects.
Many forces could give rise to this diversity of findings, from variation in the
source of identification to differences in the affected populations. Three papers
are particularly close to ours. Elsewhere, we use the same identification strategy
and examine effects on variables reported to a prime credit bureau (Bhutta, Skiba,
and Tobacman 2015). We find economically small effects on credit scores, balances, and delinquencies, but the standard errors are large enough to be compatible with the effects on bankruptcy that we document here.29 In addition, we
show that our sample of payday loan applicants was experiencing longstanding
financial distress at the time of their first payday loan applications, with low availability of credit cards, high rates of recent delinquencies, and credit scores that
had on average fallen into the bottom quartile of the national distribution for at
least 5 years.
Lefgren and McIntyre (2009) investigate the relationship between cross-
sectional geographic characteristics and bankruptcy rates, using state-level and
zip-code-level variation. Their striking primary results concern wage garnishment rules, household characteristics, and legal culture, with effects of wage garnishment restrictions amounting to 42 percent of baseline bankruptcy rates. In
addition, they report a statistically insignificant but positive relationship between
legal payday lending in a state and bankruptcy rates. Payday loan access raises the
state rate by .12 bankruptcies per thousand residents off a baseline rate of 4.46.
Morgan, Strain, and Seblani (2012), working with state-year variation in payday loan bans and difference-in-difference regressions, estimate that bans reduce
Chapter 13 filing rates by between one-sixth and one-third.
If payday loan bans affect bankruptcy propensities only for payday loan borrowers, and the payday loan borrowing rate in states without bans is 10 percent,
then the quantitative findings in Lefgren and McIntyre (2009) and Morgan,
Strain, and Seblani (2012) should be scaled up by an order of magnitude to compare with our findings here, since we estimate effects only on payday loan applicants. This rescaling would imply effect sizes of 1.2 bankruptcies (Lefgren and
29
In Bhutta, Skiba, and Tobacman (2015), we do not examine bankruptcy as an outcome because
of data limitations: bankruptcy flags appear with irregular timing in the matched credit bureau data,
and our strategy to match multiple data sets resulted in a sample with too few bankruptcy filings.
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McIntyre 2009) and .48–.93 Chapter 13 bankruptcies (Morgan, Strain, and Seblani 2012) per thousand payday loan applicants, smaller than our findings here
but of the same order of magnitude.
6.2. Welfare Implications
The welfare effects of the indebtedness and bankruptcies resulting from access
to payday loans are difficult to measure and could in principle be positive or negative. Since bankruptcy is a form of social insurance, the net social costs may lie
in transactions costs and externalities elsewhere in the credit markets. In particular, access to payday loans may cause other unsecured debt to become uncollectable, which drives up equilibrium interest rates on other forms of credit.
One window into the private costs and benefits of bankruptcy filing is provided
by the chapter of filing and the disposition of the case. Many of the benefits of a
Chapter 13 filing accrue only if and when the associated payment plan is completed and remaining debts are discharged.30 Chapter 13 filers often instead have
their cases dismissed (or converted to Chapter 7) prior to discharge for failure to
keep up the regular payments toward a Chapter 13 plan. Dobbie and Song (2015)
find that completing a Chapter 13 plan and thus discharging remaining debts relative to filing for Chapter 13 and having the case dismissed improves subsequent
earnings and lowers mortality rates.
We test for differential effects by bankruptcy chapter (7, 13, or 13 and dismissed) in Table 9. Columns 1–4 report estimated treatment effects analogous
to those in Table 4. Columns 1 and 2 show a significant impact of payday loan
access on Chapter 13 but not on Chapter 7 filings. Columns 3 and 4 show that the
effect on Chapter 13 filings is primarily attributable to cases that were dismissed.
Similar results appear for the multinomial logit specifications, which respect
more of the structure of the debtor’s choice environment. For various sets of controls, the estimates are most reliably statistically significant for Chapter 13 filings
that are eventually dismissed. However, all of the point estimates for effects on
Chapter 7 bankruptcy are also positive, and the standard errors are always large
enough that we cannot statistically reject the hypothesis that the 7, 13, and 13 and
dismissed estimates are the same.31
One other possible window into welfare implications is provided by analysis of heterogeneous treatment effects. Table OA14 reports estimates by gender, race, and homeownership status from the reduced-form specification with
a ±.5-standard-deviation credit-score range. Column 1 repeats the benchmark
numbers from regression results in Table 4 for comparison. In the other columns,
sample sizes shrink so standard errors are large and no effects are statistically significant. Column 12 examines effects on service members, because of concerns
by regulators, elected representatives, and the Department of Defense (2006) that
30
We are very grateful to an anonymous referee for highlighting this point and suggesting the
following analysis.
31
Tables OA11–OA13 report optimal bandwidth version of the regressions in Table 9, analogous
to those in Table 5, for Chapter 7 filings, Chapter 13 filings, and Chapter 13 filings that were eventually dismissed. Figures OA3–OA8 similarly replicate the main figures.
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Note. Columns 1–4 report reduced-form effects, in percentage points, of the above-threshold indicator on bankruptcy filings. The multinomial logit models report
marginal effects of the above-threshold indicator on the various bankruptcy outcomes. Standard errors are in parentheses. N = 31,892.
+ P < .1.
* P < .05.
** P < .01.
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Table 9
Multinomial Analysis of Payday Loan Impacts over 2 Years
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payday loans disproportionately affect military personnel.32 We estimate an economically large positive effect of payday loans on service members’ bankruptcies,
which (not surprising given the small sample) is statistically insignificant.
More broadly, Han and Li (2011) show that the available terms of borrowing
are worse (for example, credit card interest rates are higher by 116 basis points)
for households that have filed for bankruptcy than households that have not. Similarly, Han, Keys, and Li (2011) find that direct-mail credit card offers generally
worsen for recent bankruptcy filers. These empirical results combine the effect of
whatever led to the bankruptcy filing with the effect of the bankruptcy filing itself.
Dobbie and Song (2015) and Dobbie, Goldsmith-Pinkham, and Yang (2017) focus on the quasi-experimental effect of a Chapter 13 filing alone and find it to be
highly beneficial, reducing foreclosure rates, mortality, civil judgments, and repossessions and increasing earnings, homeownership, and credit scores.
Taken together, the related literature and our estimates carry the following interpretation. The bankruptcy filings induced by payday loan access cause other
debt to become uncollectable for these borrowers, which may cause interest rates
to rise for other ex ante indistinguishable borrowers, so the externalities are unlikely to be positive. The net private costs are difficult to ascertain, but it appears
that the payday applicants induced to file for bankruptcy receive benefits from its
social insurance aspects that are toward the low end. Regardless, a bankruptcy filing is a rare but interesting and high-consequence indicator of financial distress.
7. Conclusion
We find that payday loan applicants barely approved for their first loans file for
bankruptcy protection significantly more often than barely rejected first-time applicants. The magnitude of the effect is economically nontrivial, representing an
increase of about 1 percentage point in the bankruptcy-filing rate. Opportunities
for rejected applicants to substitute with credit elsewhere (Carter 2015; B
 hutta,
Goldin, and Homonoff 2016) imply that our quantitative findings are lower
bounds on the true effects, but by estimating the effects as a function of this firm’s
zip-code-level market share, we document that the bias is likely to be small.
Equally importantly, we evaluate four major candidate mechanisms for the increase in bankruptcy rates. We find the most support for a mechanism that to
our knowledge is novel in the literature, that is, reductions in household cash
flow due to the debt service burden. Taken together, our results are consistent
with the view that payday loans exacerbate financial distress and that household
cash flow should be more intensively explored as a driver of bankruptcy-filing
decisions. First-time payday loan approval causes significant additional high-
interest-rate borrowing, and the consequent interest burden may worsen house32
We code an applicant as a member of the military if (ignoring capitalization) his or her employer name contains “Marines,” “Marine Corps,” “Air Force,” “USAF,” or “Army” but not “Salv”
or if it contains “Navy” but not “Old Navy.” This yields 2,332 service member observations in the
full data set and 638 observations in the 31,892 observations within .5 standard deviations of the
threshold.
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hold cash flow sufficiently to induce bankruptcy. The bankruptcies that result are
often dismissed Chapter 13 filings that do not result in a discharge, providing less
benefit to the debtors. The welfare implications of our empirical findings depend
on difficult-to-estimate parameters like the private and social net costs of bankruptcy filings.
Our research also informs the ongoing public debate related to payday loan
regulation. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau issued a payday loan rule
requiring lenders to “reasonably determine that the consumer has the ability to
repay the loan” (12 C.F.R. sec. 1041 [2017]). The date for lenders to comply with
these rules was set for August 2019. The current administration suspended the
rule indefinitely before implementation and, in the spring of 2019, proposed rolling back that portion of the final payday regulation rule. Our findings contribute
to the body of research that policy makers may consider in moving forward with
the regulation of payday loans. We hope that these findings, and the questions
they raise, advance ongoing discussion about payday lending and the determinants of bankruptcy.
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